Thursday, March 10, 2005

Smylie: What it says.

Smylie, decided 4-1, with Chief Justice Shepard writing the majority opinion and Justice Dickson dissenting, decides a number of Blakely related issues for Indiana, and a simple list might be useful. I will try to be as simply factual as I can about what the court decided.

  • Blakely applies to Indiana's sentencing scheme to the extent that an enhanced sentence must be justified by the finding of an aggravating circumstance.
That is, Indiana does have a determinate sentencing scheme. It is even more determinate than Washington State's, because the sentencing "range" authorized by a juries verdict is a single point: the "fixed term" mentioned in the statutes and usually referred to in the cases as "the presumptive sentence." Slip op. at 5, 6.

That determinate sentencing scheme is affected by Blakely, because, "Indiana’s sentencing system runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment not because it mandates a “fixed term” sentence for each felony, but because it mandates both a fixed term and permits judicial discretion in finding aggravating or mitigating circumstances to deviate from the fixed term." (Slip op. at 7.)

  • Facts that are used to enhance a sentence above the presumptive must be found by a jury.
The court does not Booker-ize the sentencing statutes by saying that the "fixed term" mentioned in the statutes has no binding effect, allthough it says that would be an option. Slip op. at 8.

  • Blakely does not apply to or limit a judge's discretion to impose consecutive sentences.
"There is no constitutional problem with consecutive sentenceing so long as the trial court does not exceed the combined statutory maximums." Slip op. at 9.

  • Smylie's relief is a reversal of his enhanced sentences, affirmance of the consecutive [nature of?] sentences, and a remand for resentencing before a jury at the State's election.
I guess the rationale behind affirming the consecutive sentences that have just been reversed as to enhancements, at least, means that were the State to choose not to seek a jury trial of the Blakely aggravating circumstances in the case, the trial court could impose consecutive presumptive sentences. But that makes no sense either, because the Court remands "for a new sentencing" on both counts for which Smylie was convicted. Slip op. at 10So I end where I began: how does a court affirm sentences in one respect that it has just reversed in another? I guess this case shows us how.

  • A Blakely claim is available to anyone whose case was still pending on direct review at the time Blakely was decided (June 24, 2004) and who challenged his or her sentence on appeal.
That description of the class is mine and may be broader than the court intends. The court does say that "it is appropriate to be rather liberal in approaching whether an appellant and her lawyer have adequately preserved and raised a Blakely issue." Slip op. at 14. But what the court actually says in two paragraphs on page 15 should not go unquoted:

Nevertheless, it does not ask too much that a criminal defendant have contested his or her sentence on appeal, even if the Blakely element of that contest is added later, as it has been by Smylie. Thus, we regard defendants such as Smylie who sought sentence relief from the Court of Appeals based on arbitrariness or unreasonableness (Appellant’s Br. at 3), and who added a Blakely claim by amendment or on petition to transfer as having adequately presented the issue of the constitutionality of their sentence under Blakely.

Defendants who have appealed without raising any complaint at all about the propriety of their sentence have arguably made the sort of knowing and intelligent decision regarding their appeal that is required for waiver to exist. Thus, those defendants who have not raised objections to their sentences should be deemed to have at least forfeited, and likely waived, the issue for review.

There is some number of people who: 1) challenged their sentence in the Court of Appeals; 2) had petitions to transfer denied before Blakely was decided; but 3) whose direct appeals were not yet final when Blakely was decided. This is so, because direct appeals are not final until the time for filing a cert. petition has passed, 90 days after the denial of transfer.

I have no idea what the number is. But are they now going to be entitled to post-conviction relief based on Blakely? At page 13 of the opinion, the court says that its approach is "entirely consistent with the dictates of Griffith [v. Kentucky]." I should think post-conviction relief would be available to the 90-day folks. The problem is, I don't know what the post-conviction claim would be, since the court says on page 15, that a lawyer cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise a Blakely claim before Blakely was decided. I suppose due process and equal protection claims might be available.

Justice Dickson's dissent is noteworthy in two respects. First, he would have Booker-ized the sentencing statutes. Second, he says that people who successfully challenge their sentences under Blakely may ultimately, on remand, as I understand it, receive greater sentences than they did the first time around. There's no citation to authority for the latter proposition; and the majority opinion does not deal with the issue at all.

I think that is a pretty fair summary of what Smylie says. As always, I invite corrections by comment.

I leave the beginning of the commentary for tomorrow--er, later today, now.

Smylie!!! (Hidden in Plain View) / No Heath

Smylie is out. Heath is not. Smylie is not in the place you would normally expect it, but under the judiciary home page: Smylie v. State, Supreme Court No. 41S01-0409-CR-408 (Ind. March 9, 2005). Because no one, practically speaking, knew where it was, Marcia Oddi at the Indiana Law Blog has posted the PDF version, which I think she got from the court's clerk. Thank you, Marcia.

It took a while before I got to the email in which someone sent me the link to the HTML version. If Smylie is important enough to post on its home page, one would think the court could put a copy in
its usual place for daily opinions as well, or at least in the archive. I don't know about anyone else who practices law in this state, but I don't recall the last time I looked at the court's home page. I also don't recall the last time the court had an opinion posted there and nowhere else. That's probably because I never look at the court's home page.

Heath is not out. I checked the docket, and the last action in that case was Heath's citation to additional authority on January 12th, which was presumably a note to the court that
Booker had just been decided. I can only guess that Heath was not decided, because Smylie involves both enhanced and consecutive sentences, and Heath does not.

The only commentary I have seen so far is Doug Berman's at
Sentencing Law & Policy. Although it might cost him a few hits on his site meter, I am going to quote the entire post, available here, below:

In what appears to be the most comprehensive state supreme court decision to date (and the first major post-Booker state supreme court ruling), the Indiana Supreme Court today has ruled on Blakely's applicability to Indiana's sentencing structure in Smylie v. Indiana, No. 41 SO 1-0409-CR-408 (Ind. Mar. 9, 2005) (available here courtesy of The Indiana Law Blog, which already has highlights here).

Smylie appears to be, from a quick skim, a very thorough and thoughtful decision (and I was very pleased and flattered to see this blog getting a "shout out" in footnote 12 of the Court's opinion, although The Indiana Law Blog notes here that I am slightly mis-cited). The Indiana Supreme Court in Smylie has held Blakely applicable to Indiana's laws and has concluded that Blakely-ization (and not Booker-ization) is the appropriate remedy, i.e., the Court rejects the suggestion to make its statutory sentencing structure advisory and instead calls for jury determinations of sentence enhancing facts.

The Smylie decision also covers some retroactivity issues and is certainly today's must-read for Blakely addicts. I am already looking forward to Marci Oddi's commentary at The Indiana Law Blog and also Michael Ausbrook's at INCourts.
So, with the preliminary aggro out of the way, I shall now move on to a fresh post about what Smylie actually says. After that, a post about why, at the moment at least, I take a pretty dim view of most of the opinion. I guess I should try being less of a malcontent and be grateful, nigh unto rejoicing, for the little it does, grudgingly, get right. I have a few clients who are going to be thrilled.

Wednesday, March 02, 2005

A word from the ghost in the machine . . .

I have to apologize to anyone who is getting my posts as RSS feeds. If you receive a post that looks like gibberish, at least as a matter of format, then I can only suggest that you visit the page a short time later. I'm experimenting with methods of posting. (Maybe I need to seek professional help.) The last experiment with Bloggar was a disaster. And I usually have to go in after posting and clean up things that didn't come out right the first time.

I was using NVU. I've been trying FrontPage. The Wysiwig HTML editors all seem to paste diferrently into posts, with the differences having their own differences based on the browser I'm using at the moment. (Anyone who has not tried FireFox should. It is amazing, once you start adding the little doo-dads they call "extensions." The things you can do to tabs and bookmark behavior alone make the move to FF something worth considering. And for those rare times you just have to use IE, there's an extension to put "View this page in IE" in the right-click context menu.)

'Nuff technical stuff. I'm not a tech geek. I know just enough to be very dangerous. (That Bloggar post of a few moments ago not only came out terribly, it changed the font-size for the title are and sidebars. Don't ask me how.)

California: More Booker back-pedaling

I am simply gobsmacked to find that the Indinana judges who are now pulling back from Blakely's applicability to Indiana sentencing.

I have not yet looked at even most of the California Court of Appeals Blakely opinions since Booker--the output has been prodigious--but I offer up this carved-up bit from an upublished opinion, People v. Forest, Case No. F044151 (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Feb. 24, 2005) (mem.)

California's determinative sentencing law differs from the federal and Washington schemes because in California each crime is assigned a three-tier sentencing range. The midterm is presumed to be the proper sentence, unless mitigating factors suggest the lower or mitigated term is appropriate, or aggravating factors suggest the upper or aggravated term is appropriate.

. . . .

Prior to Booker, the question of whether the decision to impose aggravated terms violated Blakely was subject to serious debate.

. . . .

We think that Booker, however, resolves the confusion caused by Blakely and establishes that California's determinate sentencing law does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.

First, the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens reaffirms that a trial court has discretion to impose sentences within a prescribed statutory range relying on facts not necessarily found true by the jury. We note that nothing in Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker suggests that a trial court does not have authority to choose a specific sentence within the initial range identified in each opinion. n6 It is only when the trial court exceeds
the initial statutory range that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right is implicated.

Which brings us to our second point. We think the proper analysis of Booker establishes that Apprendi and Blakely were intended to apply to enhancements to a sentence. n7 In other words, Justice Stevens clarified that the Sixth Amendment applies when an enhancement increases a defendant's sentence, but has no application when a sentence is imposed within a range of possible sentences. We also note that in each case it was the trial court that found the enhancement true, using the preponderance of the evidence standard.

Third, Justice Stevens's opinion acknowledged that the only constitutional defect to the federal sentencing guidelines was their mandatory nature. The remedy chosen by the majority of the Supreme Court was to give trial court's discretion in imposing a sentence, apparently, even if the sentence was within the enhanced range. Thus, all members of the United States Supreme Court agree that judicial discretion in sentencing does not violate the Constitution.

California's determinate sentencing law does not suffer the constitutional defects of the statutes addressed in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker. A trial court in California has discretion to choose either a mitigated term, the midterm, or an aggravated term. When a trial court imposes an aggravated term, it is exercising discretion within a prescribed statutory range. A jury using the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard must find all enhancements to the sentence true. This is the type of system that we read Booker to require. Therefore, we reject Forest's argument that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated when the trial court imposed an aggravated sentence.

(Footnotes omitted).

Sorry. It doesn't pass theDilts test, if I correctly understand that in California, absent a finding of some aggravating circumstance, an upper-term sentence will be reversed on appeal. Maybe someone more knowledgeable about California law will comment.

Tuesday, March 01, 2005

The Indiana Supreme Court Archives

I sucked the Indiana Supreme Court online archive into Acrobat. It only took two hours for Acrobat to get the files and do the necessary conversion. The Court of Appeals' archive took almost eight. It took a while to save the file as well while Acrobat "removed unused objects"--whatever that means.

There are only 9,796 pages, compared with almost 32,500 for the Court of Appeals. The file weighs in at a modest 43 megabytes, compared with 137 MB for the Court of Appeals.

The relative bulks of the archives actually make sense. There are five Supreme Court justices and fifteen judges of the Court of Appeals--plus a senior judge or two. So the Supreme Court's opinion output ought to be about a third of that of the Court of Appeals. Plus the Supreme Court justices only have two clerks--the Chief Justice has three. Court of Appeals judges have three. And then there are the Supreme Court's considerable and wide-ranging administrative responsibilities--everything from supervising the lower courts to attorney admission and discipline to overseeing all of the various court rules.

One may or may not generally like what the Supreme Court does, but I'd say they do a lot of it. And after this little Acrobat exercise, I have a lot less sympathy for what used to be, at least, the complaint from various quarters of the Court of Appeals about its case load.

It has occurred to me that simply leeching single HTML, WordPerfect, or Word files into a single directory so that each case has a separate file might create a local database with more useful search results coming out of something like WordPerfect's indexing capability. Maybe I'll try that next year.

I wish somebody would do something this year about the incredibly time-consuming setup of the online docket. The way you have to keep coming back out to the main menu makes it almost useless for anything but checking a single case at a time.

In the meanwhile, two Blakely cases came down from the Court of Appeals today. More Booker tom-foolery. If you ask the wrong question, you are very likely to get the wrong answer.

The short of it is: Dilts. Blakely is not about judicial discretion; it is about entitlement by a defendant to a particular sentence absent judge-found facts. And the Indiana sentencing statutes do provide for a range that is the equivalent of the range provided by base offense level in the Federal Guidelines. It is not the full range of sentence in the sentencing statutes. It is a point range, namely, the presumptive sentence, beyond which a judge may not go without finding additional facts.

I'll get into details of the cases soon, I hope. But while the prosecutors are Blakelyizing informations, is the Indiana Supreme Court going to Bookerize the sentencing statutes?

Heath? Smylie? Are you out there?

Indiana Blakely List Update

I have updated the list of Indiana's Blakely cases on the sidebar. The Indiana Supreme Court has lots of Blakely decisions pending on transfer. Of special note only is an order issued yesterday in Wright that the court has taken the transfer petition under advisement pending the resolution of other (presumably Blakely) cases.

It looks like the Supreme Court has denied transfer in every case denying relief under Blakely. The court has transfer pending in every case granting relief under Blakely in which transfer was sought.

Holden seems to be a special case. That is the case in which the Court of Appeals (Judges Sullivan, May, and Vaidik) said that Blakely was "superficially applicable to a sentence greater than the presumptive," but denied any relief. The Supreme Court denied cross-petitions to transfer.

Roper v. Simmons: Hats off to Missouri.

Roper v. Simmons was decided today. No more death sentences for children. Amen.

Maybe life without parole will go by the boards as well eventually.

How often is it that a state supreme court makes new federal constitutional law followed by an affirmance by the U.S. Supremes? Never, in my recollection. (I invite comments correcting me about this, as about everything.)

Chapeau to the Missouri Supreme Court.

The Court of Appeals Archive in Acrobat

Just for the fun of it, I imported into Acrobat all the cases from the Court of Appeals on-line archive from the first case on January 5th, 1999, through yesterday, February 28th, 2005. I don't know how many cases there are, but the file is 32,406 pages long, and the PDF file is 137 megabytes.

It took almost eight hours for Acrobat to download and convert the files even with DSL, so I don't recommend the procedure for dial-up connections.

The file came out quite nicely, though. The cases appear in chronological order, and each Acrobat created a bookmark for each. I guess I could find out how many cases there are by figuring out a way to count the bookmarks, minus one, for the table of contents, which is just the Court of Appeals archive web page, which links to all of the cases in the file by name, just as the web page does.

I don't know if it is going to be useful or not. At the moment, I think it's pretty nifty.

Dilts: Oregon got it all right.

In prior posts, here and here, I mentioned the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in State v. Dilts, decided way back on December 16th. In the first post, I suggested that a Blakely best practice might be to follow the Oregon Supreme Court in not deciding all the theoretical problems that might arise on remand following a Blakely reversal. After reversing Dilts sentence, the Oregon Supreme Court said: "[W]e do not speculate as to the specific positions that the parties may take before the trial court respecting that court's authority in the resentencing proceedings. It is inappropriate to address statutory issues, as well as more fundamental state and federal constitutional issues, relating, inter alia, to indictment, notice, and jury trial until they have been raised before and decided by the trial court."

The entire approach of the Oregon Supreme in reversing Dilts's sentence as well, it seems to me, is extremely important. It is simple and almost mathematically elegant in its avoidance of doctrinal dispute about the meaning of individual sentencing statutes.. The court looked at what the United States Supreme Court did in Blakely and then did the same thing themselves. This should not be surprising, perhaps, because Dilts was remanded to the Oregon Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Blakely.

The test in Dilts, taken from Blakely, is quite simply: Would a sentence be reversed without judge-made findings? Here is the passage itself from Dilts:

The [Blakely] Court noted that, if the trial court had imposed the 90-month sentence solely on the basis of the plea -- that is, without making the additional finding regarding deliberate cruelty -- then the trial court would have been reversed. Id. at 2538.

. . . .

Here, the presumptive sentence that was based on the facts that were alleged in the indictment and admitted by defendant in his guilty plea was 15 to 18 months' imprisonment, so the "statutory maximum" sentence that the trial court could have imposed without making additional factual findings was 18 months' imprisonment. If the trial court had imposed its sentence of 36 months' imprisonment without finding the additional facts regarding the racial motivation for the assault, then that sentence would have been subject to reversal on appeal.

It is absolutely clear from Indiana case law that a sentence above the presumptive must be supported by the judicial finding of at least one aggravating circumstance to survive an appeal. That really should be the end of the discussion about Blakely's applicability to Indiana's sentencing scheme. Booker has nothing to say about this, in my view, and there is no reason to re-examine Blakely in Indiana because of Booker.

Simple solutions may be for the simple-minded. But I have not been able to find a flaw in the very simple test. Perhaps someone else can and post it in a comment.

In fact, the Oregon Supreme Court got it all right and even provided the major thrust of the severability analysis one might have expected from the U.S. Supreme Court in Booker:

As stated above, we hold in this case only that, under Blakely, the sentencing guidelines were applied unconstitutionally to defendant. We agree with the state that this decision will have a significant impact on criminal sentencing because Blakely also makes it clear that whenever a trial court, in the absence of an effective waiver, imposes a sentence that exceeds the presumptive sentence on the basis of aggravating facts found by the trial court rather than by a jury (other than the fact of a prior conviction), that sentence amounts to an unconstitutional application of the sentencing guidelines.

However, the fact that the sentencing guidelines may be applied unconstitutionally, as they were in this case, does not mean that we must reject the sentencing guidelines themselves as unconstitutional. On the contrary, the Court in Blakely specifically stated that determinate sentencing schemes, like Oregon's sentencing guidelines, are permissible if they are implemented "in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment." 124 S Ct at 2540; see also id. at 2540-41 (rejecting argument that Blakely undermines determinate sentencing and concluding that focus instead is on protecting jury trial right). Because we have not held that a part of the sentencing guidelines is unconstitutional, we can identify no unconstitutional part of the guidelines that might be appropriate to sever. Rather than add to or subtract from the words in the sentencing guidelines, as the state suggests, our holding simply requires Oregon courts to apply the guidelines "in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment." 124 S Ct at 2540.

I think because the Oregon Supreme Court was considering a remand for reconsideration in light of Blakely, it took some special care in its decision. There is no vote line in the on-line opinion, but there don't appear to have been any dissents.

I think any state court that ignores the Dilts test will be at serious risk of a successful cert. petition. Unfortunately, that is also what makes it so likely that state courts will opt to do a Booker themselves. The United States Supreme Court can hardly object to that now.

Monday, February 28, 2005

Booker: Sleeping dogs lie no more.

WIth the Indiana Supreme Court silent and judges of the Court of Appeals beginning to bail out, I think it's time to come out of Booker-induced hibernation. Also, because of the snow storm back east, the Natale / Abdullah / Franklin arguments in the New Jersey Supreme Court have been put off from tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. until March 14th. Nature abhors a vacuum.

I haven't written anything about Booker, and I haven't really wanted to. But now that Indiana judges are starting to do considerable violence to it and to reason--about which more in the next post--I have to put in my tuppence.

I haven't wanted to say anything about Booker because it was, for me, ultimately, incredibly infuriating and incredibly boring. It was also an incredible waste of all the care given to the problems posed by Blakely by some quite imaginative, thoughtful, and clever federal judges. And all in the name of efficient administration--at the cost of a new, unheard-of severability analysis that cannot pass the laugh-test. I think Justice Stevens adequately detonated any plausibility to Justice Breyer's opinion when he wrote in his dissent:

Our "severability" precedents, however, cannot support the Court's remedy because there is no provision of the SRA or the Guidelines that falls outside of Congress' power. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678, 684 (1987). Accordingly, severability analysis simply does not apply.

. . . .

Rather than rely on traditional principles of facial invalidity or severability, the majority creates a new category of cases in which this Court may invalidate any part or parts of a statute (and add others) when it concludes that Congress would have preferred a modified system to administering the statute in compliance with the Constitution. This is entirely new law. Usually the Court first declares unconstitutional a particular provision of law, and only then does it inquire whether the remainder of the statute can be saved. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, 468 U. S., at 652; Alaska Airlines, 480 U. S., at 684. Review in this manner limits judicial power by minimizing the damage done to the statute by judicial fiat. There is no case of which I am aware, however, in which this Court has used "severability" analysis to do what the majority does today: determine that some unconstitutional applications of a statute, when viewed in light of the Court's reading of "likely" legislative intent, justifies the invalidation of certain statutory sections in their entirety, their constitutionality notwithstanding, in order to save the parts of the statute the Court deemed most important. The novelty of this remedial maneuver perhaps explains why no party or amicus curiae to this litigation has requested the remedy the Court now orders. In addition, none of the federal courts that have addressed Blakely's application to the Guidelines has concluded that striking down §3553(b)(1) is a proper solution.

Most importantly, the Court simply has no authority to invalidate legislation absent a showing that it is unconstitutional. To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall, an "act of the legislature" must be "repugnant to the constitution" in order to be void. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). When a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, that provision is void, and the Judiciary is therefore not bound by it in a particular case. Here, however, the provisions the majority has excised from the statute are perfectly valid: Congress could pass the identical statute tomorrow and it would be binding on this Court so long as it were administered in compliance with the Sixth Amendment. Because the statute itself is not repugnant to the Constitution and can by its terms comport with the Sixth Amendment, the Court does not have the constitutional authority to invalidate it.

(Footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

Professor Paul Kirgis of St. John's law school writes in an abstract of a forthcoming article in the Georgia Law Review: "Booker fails on its face as a matter of logic. Its constitutional remedy negates the very right the case purports to protect."

Maybe someday something will come to light to explain Justice Ginsburg's vote. I do not think anything will ever come to light to attenuate the taint, as fourth amendment law puts it, attached to Justice Breyer's being the one to save the Guidelines he had so much to do with creating.

Don't get me wrong. Justice Breyer is (usually) smart, engaging, and interesting. And that is what makes his remedial opinion especially indefensible. Justice Stevens mentions "judicial fiat." Well, quite. Justice Breyer might just as well have simply said what "fiat" means in Latin: "Let it be so." The opinion's legal apparatus is a fig leaf without much, if any, coverage.

I have not seen any state courts do a Booker yet, but the the New Jersey Attorney General is certainly asking the New Jersey Supreme Court to do the dive in Natale, Abdullah, and Franklin.

On the Indiana front, recall that Justice Dickson suggested at the Heath and Smylie oral arguments that to save the Indiana sentencing scheme--which is also not unconstitutional on its face--one might simply construe "shall" to mean "may" in one place. At the time, the suggestion shocked me. After Booker, nothing would surprise me. And the fact that Heath and Smylie have not yet been decided leads me to conclude that Booker may have caused the Indiana Supreme Court to rethink, at least in part, whatever it was preparing.

That's why I found Booker infuriating. Not only did the Administrators prevail, they did so by making the lawyers, the lower court judges, and the law, itself, irrelevant. I happens all the time in Indiana. It is, in fact, the genius, from a certain perspective, of the Indiana legal establishment that much is done to make sure that everyone has a lawyer. The courts from top to bottom then do equally much or more to make the lawyers irrelevant. (In criminal law, the State is usually, but not always, the beneficiary of this arrangement. Imagine my surprise upon obtaining, once upon a time, post-conviction relief for a client on a claim I had never made. Imagine the Client's surprise. I think I have a pretty good idea of how some Justice Department lawyers must have felt on seeing Justice Breyer's remedial opinion.)

I found Booker boring because: 1) it really does leave everything up to the Administrators, with some minor wrangling to be done in the federal courts about appellate review of sentences under the judicially imposed advisory Guidelines; and 2) contrary to two recent opinions of judges on the Indiana Court of Appeals, Booker has almost no application, doctrinally, to Indiana's sentencing scheme. (The "almost" is important, because a portion of Justice Stevens' dissent does, arguably, resolve a certain uncertainty in Blakely's Indiana application.) I also don't think Booker has much application to other state sentencing schemes that I have looked at.

I think it was Walker Percy who wrote that about the time a man gets bored, a dog goes to sleep. I think Booker caused me to get in touch with my inner dog and sent me into hibernation.

Well, I'm awake now, and there's some barking to catch up on.

Saturday, January 22, 2005

City of Bloomington Settles Taser Case

KempLog is reporting here that the City of Bloomington has settled its part in the taser case for half a million dollars. For those who have not heard of the case, there's a good background story in the Bloomington Alternative and another report on the settlement in the Indianapolis Star. (The short of it is that a 47-year old, mentall ill man was shocked something like 6 times by a taser at the Monroe County jail. He died.)

I don't usually try to cover news, because others do it a great deal better than I ever would or could. But this awful story from my back yard deserves all the publicity it can get.

[Update]: PSoTD (Political Site of the Day) posted this summary from WolfPopper about a class action suit underway against Taser International, Inc., for securities fraud.

Thursday, January 20, 2005

State of the Judiciary 2005

Here's the link to Chief Justice Shepard's State of the Judiciary message delivered yesterday. Possibly of Blakely interest is the opening paragraph of the section titled, "Rebuilding the American Jury":

Something else that’s needed attention for a long time is the way we manage that birthright of all Americans, trial by jury. Most schoolchildren know that when the nobles confronted King John on the field at Runnymeade in 1215 that one of the promises Magna Carta contained was the right to a trial by your peers, but these days the legal press is running stories about the disappearance of the American jury trial. We’ve too long taken it for granted.

(Emphasis added). One reading of Blakely, of course, is that jury trials have disappeared with respect to some facts necessary to increased punishment. It will be interesting to see where Chief Justice Shepard comes down in Heath and Smylie with respect to jury trials.

Tuesday, January 18, 2005

Back at It: Two Rehearing Opinions

I'm back. It's been a long time since the last post on January 3rd. No Sunday pickles, no nothing. Ugly traveling, followed by uglier diseases, followed by mid-winter burst pipe, followed by post-Cabbage Patch catch-up, which is far from caught up . . .

Fortunately, all that has happened is Booker and Fanfan were handed down. No big deal, as it turns out, for the States, anyway. Or maybe it will be. Maybe the Indiana Supreme Court, for example, will declare unconstitutional a select few statutes that are not unconstitutional on their face a la Booker. I'd not have thought such an approach would pass the laugh test. After Booker, good luck with a due process challenge on cert. to such an approach.

There have only been a couple of Blakely opinions from the Court of Appeals thus far this year, both on rehearing. The first, rehearing in Strong v. State, Court of Appeals No. 49A02-0401-CR-25 (Ind. Ct. App. January 12, 2003), granting reh'g is all about waiver / procedural default. (Judge Bailey writing for Judges Sharpnack and May). The original opinion from November 5th is here and had this to say about the State's waiver argument in the first instance:

Indeed, in Apprendi, the statutory maximum was the ten-year prescribed statutory maximum, which a defendant could receive for a second-degree offense if the preponderance of certain aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as found by the trial court, weighed in favor of the higher term. By contrast, in Blakely, the “statutory maximum” is the maximum sentence that a trial judge may impose without any additional findings, i.e., the presumptive or standard sentence. Because Blakely redefined the “statutory maximum” for purposes of Apprendi, a defendant, such as Strong, who challenges his enhanced sentence but fails to do so on grounds of Apprendi has not waived his argument pursuant to Blakely. Accordingly, we find no waiver. Moreover, we note that Strong’s failure to object to his enhanced sentence at the trial level, by itself, does not constitute waiver. Instead, the right to a trial by jury, which is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and by Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution, is subject to a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Leone v. State, 797 N.E.2d 743, 752 (Ind. 2003). A defendant’s failure to object is not tantamount to such an affirmative act of waiver.

(Footnote omitted).

The rehearing opinion is somewhat less categorical. After reiterating and reaffirming the discussion above, the court says:

We caution, however, that this holding should not be interpreted to imply that a defendant might never waive his or her Blakely argument. Rather, there are circumstances wherein a defendant may waive his or her Blakely contention. For example, as noted by the Blakely court, guilty plea defendants may waive their Apprendi rights by either stipulating to the relevant facts supporting the sentence enhancements or consenting to judicial factfinding. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541.

Additionally, a defendant may “waive” the right to raise an issue at a particular juncture through procedural default. See Bledsoe v. State, 815 N.E.2d 507, 507 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding, on petition for rehearing, that a defendant had “technically waived” any argument that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment right to have the facts supporting the enhancement of his sentence determined by a jury, pursuant to Blakely, because he raised such issue for the first time on rehearing when he should have raised it during the direct appeal, i.e., the appropriate procedural “juncture”), trans. denied; see also Carson v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1187, 1188-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“Given that Carson did not challenge his sentence on direct appeal, he has technically waived review of this issue, and the appropriate procedure would have been to challenge his sentence through post-conviction relief. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(a)(1).”), reh’g denied.

(Footnotes omitted). I cannot reconcile the two opinions, unless the court is saying that Strong would have been out of luck had he raised Blakely for the first time in his rehearing petition. The difference between Strong and Carson and Bledsoe with respect to procedural default is, of course, that rehearing petitions were the first opportunity for Carson and Bledsoe to raise the Blakely arguments / claims. So maybe yes, Strong should have been out of luck had he not raised Blakely in his opening brief.

The unambiguous lesson of Strong appears to be that the failure to object in the trial court, even after Blakely, does not constitute either a waiver or procedural default of the claim.

The second rehearing opinion came today in Aguilar v. State, Court of Appeals No. 49A05-0307-CR-370 (Ind. Ct. App. January 18, 2005), granting reh'g. Judge Crone wrote for Judge Barnes, who wrote a concurring opinion; Judge Baker, predictably now, dissented. The majority opinion says nothing about waiver or procedural default. It does however remand for resentencing by a jury, at the State's option, over a double jeopardy argument by Aguilar.

I still wonder where the authorization for a jury trial of Blakely aggravators comes from. (Small potatos, I suppose, compared to what the Remedy 5 did in Booker.) So the split in the Court of Appeals widens a bit: Trusley, in a footnote, says juries are just fine; and the Aguilar court here moves it into text, although there is still no explanation of how a sentencing jury is authorized. Patrick, on the other hand, appears to say no to sentencing juries. See this earlier post.

Judge Barnes concurring opinion treats waiver as follows:

I concur fully, but point out the specific chronology of this case. Aguilar was sentenced on June 27, 2003, and he timely initiated a direct appeal. The case was fully briefed as of May 24, 2004. Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. We affirmed his conviction on July 9, 2004, and Aguilar filed this petition for rehearing on July 19, 2004, well within the thirty-day limit for filing a rehearing petition. See Ind. Appellate Rule 54(B).

It is clear that newly announced constitutional rules must be applied to all cases still pending on direct review when the rule was announced. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). The fact is this appeal was in our pipeline when Blakely was handed down and the rehearing petition was timely filed. Blakely was decided before our original opinion in this case was certified as final. Aguilar’s direct appeal was still pending when Blakely was decided and, therefore, it must be applied here.

In another set of circumstances, I would not be as kindly disposed to the appellant. This remand for sentencing does not open all previous aggravated sentences to collateral attack under Blakely.

(Emphasis added). So Judge Barnes comes out on the side of Strong and opposed to CarsonBledsoe: if rehearing is the first opportunity to raise Blakely, then there is no procedural default. and

Judge Barnes' opinion is also the first, I believe, to raise the spectre of retroactivity. I guess we'll have to wait on Heath and Smylie to see what direction that will go. Although neither raises the issue of retroactivity, if the Supreme Court finds the Blakely claims waived or procedurally defaulted for failure to raise an Apprendi objection in the trial court, full retroactivity for Blakely will be essentially meaningless.

Judge Baker has his Blakely waiver boilerplate all set up:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant rehearing in this case, inasmuch as Aguilar has raised the Blakely issue for the first time on rehearing. As a panel of this court observed in Carson v. State, 813 N.E.2d 1187, 1188-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), a defendant who fails to challenge his sentence on direct appeal has waived the issue. See also Mitchell v. State, 730 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, (holding that when a defendant does not properly bring an objection to the trial court’s attention so that the trial court may rule upon [it].

I commented on Judge Baker's approach / position in this earlier post about Williams, the first case really to engage the waiver / procedural default debate. I don't have anything to add here, except that, again, apparently Chief Judge Kirsch is the only judge on record (in his dissent in Patrick--) to agree with Judge Baker. See this earlier Christmas Eve post on Patrick.

With Booker on the books and no real guidance to be divined therefrom, we should be expecting decisions in Heath and Smylie almost momentarily.

And so it goes, back home in Indiana. And thank all numinal beings for Doug Berman, who doesn't miss a beat and is, all in all, more reliable than even certified mail.

Monday, January 03, 2005

My Case of the Year for 2004: Nope, not Blakely

The Indiana appellate courts did not produce anything on the first working day of the new year. I'm still strung up and out on a dial-up and Windows 98--next time it's going to be DSL a la polonaise.

I do have news that the New Jersey Supreme Court has snapped up the amicus brief filed in Natale, which those who know more than I suggest means the court is going to consolidate review in Abdullah and Natale. This is important, possibly, for Indiana, because of certain similarities in the two states' sentencing statutes. Of course one could also come to the conclusion that the similarities are different.

My Case of the Year for last year is, in fact, entirely unrelated to Blakely--although it does mention Blakely--and it comes from an unlikely quarter: the South Carolina Supreme Court. It's State v. Brown, No. 25863 (S.C. August 30, 2004). It deals with one of my long-standing pet peeves about something the Indiana Court of Appeals does just about every chance it gets, namely remanding for entry of conviction on a lesser included offense after it has reversed a conviction for a greater offense on sufficiency grounds. And it does this even if neither State nor the defendant requested an instruction on a lesser included offense.

The opinion is great and a great, early-year break from things Blakely.

Now I have to go find the opinion of the Court of Appeals that I swear exists in which the court reverses a conviction for a non-existent offense and remands for entry of an offense "included" in the non-existent one. Really. I'm not making this up.

Tuesday, December 28, 2004

Arizona: An older case with some new ideas

Though not easy to put up my own Christmas and New Year’s posts with all the trimmings, i.e., links, flags, and music, I have been able to catch up on some Blakely reading. There are some fascinating cases that I have missed along the way, which I guess should not be surprising since in the half-turn of Blakely World, the number of opinions reported online at least mentioning Blakely are legion, if not yet myriad. (As should be clear from my list of Indiana cases and their status posted yesterday, that does not mean that anything like that number of cases actually decide anything based on Blakely. That is, a large percentage of cases that mention Blakely are non-Blakely cases, especially those coming out of the Circuit Courts of Appeal that have rejected Blakely’s application to the federal Guidelines.)

I still want to get to Dilts, but I just read a fascinating opinion from the Arizona Court of Appeals that is already venerable, if not ancient, having been decided on November 10th: State v. Resendis-Felix, 100 P.3d 457 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 Dep’t A November 10, 2004). The majority and concurring opinions really add something new to the Blakely debate—at least in my experience of the debate. The majority opinion treats Blakely error as "fundamental error," not subject to procedural default, but subject to harmless error analysis. The concurring opinion provides the best discussion I have seen of structural error vs. error subject to harmless error analysis, distinguishing Neder in a compelling discussion, and concluding that Blakely error is structural of the Rose v. Clark and Sullivan v. Louisiana variety. In fact, it appears the majority would have agreed with the concurrence on this point but for the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion in the remand from the United States Supreme Court in Ring, which comes down on the Neder / Cotton side of the fence, at least with respect to Apprendi.

It will be interesting to see, in the end, where the United States Supreme Court comes out on Blakely and structural error. If the Court doesn’t come up with something like the concurring opinion in Resendis-Felix, making some fine, but well-founded distinctions, something is going to have to give: either Rose and Sullivan or Neder and Cotton.

Just as the pressure to avoid retroactivity, even if just to Apprendi, will be considerable, given Blakely’s potential reach, so also will be the inclination, I think, to apply Neder and not Rose and Sullivan. Will there be anything in Booker and Fanfan about this aspect of Blakely?

Before reading the passage about Arizona "fundamental error," recall that Justice Sullivan, during the Heath and Smylie arguments, said he believed Indiana "fundamental error" to be very similar to federal plain error. I personally think that Indiana "fundamental error," at least as it has been described in the cases for many many years, is not at all like federal plain error and is much closer to what the Arizona Court of Appeals describes. It will be interesting to see if Blakely pushes the Indiana Supreme Court to now change the definition of "fundamental error" so that it becomes, in fact, more similar to federal plain error.

In any event, here is what the Resendis-Felix majority had to say:

Sentencing a defendant outside constitutional limits creates an illegal sentence, which can constitute fundamental error. "In limited circumstances, we recognize that some issues may be so important that overriding considerations concerning the integrity of the system will excuse a party's failure to raise the issue in the trial court. This limited exception is known as the doctrine of 'fundamental error.'" State v. White, 194 Ariz. 344, P 45, 982 P.2d 819, 829 (1999).

Based on the Supreme Court's holding and rationale, we believe Blakely error falls within that "limited exception" and, unless harmless, constitutes fundamental error. We will, therefore, in our discretion address Resendis-Felix's supplemental issue. See State v. Taylor, 187 Ariz. 567, 931 P.2d 1077 (App. 1996) (appellate court has authority to reverse when it discovers fundamental error); see also State v. Dewakuku, 208 Ariz. 211, P 7, 92 P. 3d 437, 440 (App. 2004) (considering application of Apprendi to finding of defendant's onrelease status, even though defendant had not objected to court's making finding below, because "a sentence that is improperly imposed can be reversed on appeal despite the lack of an objection"); State v. Johnson, 183 Ariz. 358, 903 P.2d 1116 (App. 1995) (fundamental error for trial court to make sentence-enhancement determination jury was required to make) . . . .

(Some citations omitted). There is one major difference between Arizona and Indiana "fundamental error": in Indiana, correction of fundamental error, whatever it may be, is a duty and not a matter of discretion.

The discussion of structural vs. (potentially) harmless error in the concurring opinion is lengthy and is worth reading in its entirety. An edited version, stripped of most of the legal apparatus, follows:

[W]e can only determine whether harmless error analysis is appropriate after we have assessed the nature of the underlying constitutional deprivation and the extent to which it affects the basic framework within which a trial proceeds in our criminal justice system. Although our supreme court's opinion in Ring III addressed the same species of error that we address here in the Blakely context, the nature of the resulting constitutional deprivation and its impact on the fundamental framework of our system of justice is significantly different, given the context of our state noncapital sentencing scheme. . . .

In finding that Ring error was subject to harmless error review, our supreme court emphasized that Arizona's preexisting capital sentencing scheme had provided important procedural protections inherent in the right to jury trial, including "the correct standard of proof." Ring III, 204 Ariz. 534, P 50, 65 P. 3d at 935.

In contrast, the error we address here, the judicial imposition of a non-capital sentence greater than that authorized by the jury verdict ("Blakely error"), occurred against a significantly different statutory framework. Under that framework, Resendis-Felix had no right to presentence notice of the aggravating factors that the state would assert or the trial court might find. He had no right to insist that the state present proof of those aggravating factors in conformity with the rules of evidence and, therefore, no right to challenge that information through cross-examination. And, most importantly, Resendis-Felix did not enjoy the right to insist that the aggravating factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To the contrary, the noncapital scheme does not even require the trial court to find the existence of aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.

Thus, while Ring error and Blakely error arise from the same essential flaw - the failure to afford a defendant a jury trial on facts that are necessary predicates to an increased sentence - Blakely error far more dramatically insults the core structures under which a trial proceeds and without which a trial could not "reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence." Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78. If the defendant's right to notice, to challenge adverse evidence through cross-examination, and to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are not three of the core structures by which a criminal trial assures a reliable result, I cannot fathom what those structures might be.

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has found structural error when faced with a comparatively mild insult to the framework of the criminal trial process. In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278, 281-82 (1993), it found structural error when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury so as to allow a conviction on the mere probability of guilt rather than upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. Here, Resendis-Felix was not only deprived of an accurate reasonable doubt instruction, but the trial court may well have found him guilty of four aggravating factors based only on "reasonable evidence," a standard which imposes no burden of proof at all.

In short, Resendis-Felix was entitled to a jury trial to determine whether the aggravating factors that were a necessary predicate to his aggravated sentence were proven. The trial court, in finding those factors under Arizona's sentencing scheme, fell short of that requirement in a fashion that offended the core structures under which such a jury trial would function as a reliable fact-finding process. In my view, the trial court therefore committed structural error.

The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), compels no different analysis. There, the Court found that a trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the materiality element of tax fraud was subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 15 Although Blakely error could be similarly described as the omission of an element necessary to impose an aggravated sentence and would, as such, arguably be subject to harmless error analysis under Neder, the Neder opinion itself does not encourage such a mechanical application of its holding.

First, the opinion reaffirms the standard set forth in Rose, which focuses structural error analysis on the specific features of the actual constitutional deprivation in the context of the reliability function of a jury trial. Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-9, 17 n. 2. As demonstrated above, that analysis can expose dramatically different insults to the structure of a jury trial even when the error arises from identical constitutional deprivations. Thus, the failure to provide a jury trial on an element of an offense can, under some circumstances, cause no significant disruption to the core structures of a jury trial (Ring error) while, under other circumstances, it can fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee altogether (Blakely error).

Second, the majority in Neder repeatedly suggests that it might have reached a different result if the omission in the case before it had more substantially undermined the structures designed to promote the reliability of a trial result. Initially, it observed that the omission of an element does not "necessarily" satisfy the Rose criteria for structural error. Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 ("An instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence."). Obviously, such reasoning does not preclude a finding of structural error when the omission has a comparatively more dramatic procedural impact. Moreover, in describing why "the omission of an element" would not "always render a trial unfair," the majority emphasized the limited impact of the procedural deprivation in that specific case. Id. at 9 ("Neder was tried before an impartial judge, under the correct standard of proof ...."). Finally, in rebutting Justice Scalia's critique that the court's logic would allow a trial court to direct a verdict against a defendant in a criminal case, an event characterized as structural error in Rose, the majority expressly limited its ruling allowing harmless error review to "the narrow class of cases like the present one." Id., 527 U.S. at 17 n. 2 (emphasis added).

Under the Rose analysis approved by the Court in Neder, the error in this case simply does not fall into the "narrow class of cases" addressed by Neder. Id. As discussed, Resendis-Felix did not receive the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard or the evidentiary and testimonial structure of a trial to challenge the aggravating factors the trial court ultimately found. And, unlike the circumstances in Neder and Ring, Resendis-Felix did not receive any formal notice of those aggravating factors the prosecution would seek to prove. But see United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-34 (2002) (standing alone, failure to include Apprendi element in indictment not plain error).

Neder may be readily distinguished in one other respect as well. Resendis-Felix was not merely deprived of a jury trial on one element of an allegation that was otherwise proven to the jury as to all its other elements (the scenario in Neder). Rather, he was deprived of a jury trial as to each of the four aggravating factors found - as well as all of the potential subparts of each aggravating factor. In short, Resendis-Felix lost his right to a jury trial not merely as to one uncontested component of an offense otherwise proven in all other respects, but rather, as to the totality of the grounds for aggravating his sentence beyond the presumptive sentence. For this reason, a finding of structural error here would not require a new trial focusing primarily on already "contested issues on which the jury was properly instructed" during the first trial. Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. Rather, any such trial would focus exclusively on contesting issues that Resendis-Felix never had an opportunity to litigate in a trial forum.

Whether or not one agrees with the analysis, it does not invoke "the fact of a prior decision" exception to thoughtfulness.

Monday, December 27, 2004

Indiana's Blakely List for 2004 as of 12/27/04

As part of a year-end round-up of Blakely in its Hoosier incarnation, I have put together a document in Word format with a list of all the cases I know of that mention Blakely and their current transfer or rehearing status. There are hyperlinks to the cases attached to the case names. The link to the list is here.

There are 20 published Indiana appellate opinions and one memorandum decision (that I know of) that mention Blakely. Of the 21 cases, only 14, I think are really Blakely decisions. For example, Wilkie, the first Indiana case to mention Blakely is a non-Blakely decision, as is Ruiz, the only Indiana Supreme Court case to mention Blakely. So the cases are quite modest in number.

Of the 14 actual Blakely decisions, only 4 are final in the sense that they have been certified: Carson, Bledsoe, Krebs, and Teeters. Transfer has been denied in Bledsoe and Teeters. Transfer was not sought by either party in Carson or, suprisingly, Krebs. (Krebs is surprising, because the State has pursued transfer or rehearing in every other case reversing a sentence for Blakely error.)

All of the other cases are in various stages of rehearing or transfer. Holden is the subject of cross-petitions to transfer; Lampitok and Traylor are subjects of concurrent rehearing and transfer petitions. The litigation continues apace.

The only thing I think can be gleaned from the rehearing and transfer status of the cases is that the Supreme Court, by denying transfer in Bledsoe, has blessed Carson’s and Bledsoe’s broad reading of the prior conviction exception. Neither Heath nor Smylie involve prior convictions, so Bledsoe would appear to have been the first case (that we know about) coming to the Supreme Court with the prior conviction exception on the table. I can think of no (good) reason to pass up transfer (unanimously) in Bledsoe, unless the court has nothing more to add or subtract from the Carson / Bledsoe kitchen-sink approach to the prior conviction exception.

It is also at least interesting and, in a way, possibly ominous, that the Supreme Court has not denied transfer in any case reversing a sentence for Blakely error.

Will there be any more cases this year? There are not many ticks left to this year's clock.

Thursday, December 23, 2004

Patrick v. State: The sky is not the limit.

Note: If a link is indicated and missing, I have not managed to put it in yet.

Judge Najam, who wrote two of last week’s Blakely opinions from the Court of Appeals (Ryle and Berry), is back in the Blakely news with yet another opinion: Patrick v. State, Court of Appeals No. 71A03-0407-CR-312 (Ind. Ct. App. December 23, 2004). Judge Vaidik wrote an opinion concurring in part; and Chief Judge Kirsch concurred in part and dissented in part.

The majority reverses for Blakely error a 93-year sentence arising out of multiple convictions including Murder, Battery, and Criminal Confinement. I believe this is the first opinion from the Court of Appeals to apply Blakely in the context of a guilty plea.

The court summarizes the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court as follows:

As we have discussed, the trial court identified five aggravating factors: (1) Patrick’s criminal history; (2) his probationary status at the time he committed the instant offense; (3) the victim’s age (relevant to murder only); (4) the likelihood that he will re-offend; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the crimes. Of those aggravators, the court explained that Patrick’s criminal history was "insignificant." Appellant’s App. at 817. Indeed, Patrick has only one misdemeanor conviction. The court also stated that the two "overriding" aggravating factors were the likelihood that Patrick will commit more crimes and the nature and circumstances of his offenses. Id. at 819. Those two aggravators are improper, and the sentencing statement shows that this is not a case in which the invalid aggravating circumstances played a relatively unimportant role in the trial court’s decision.
In addition to being the first plea opinion, the majority addresses one entirely new aspect of Blakely in Indiana. It dispenses with the State’s argument, made in the Heath and Smylie oral arguments as well, I believe, that a single valid aggravating circumstance opens up the entire range of sentence above the presumptive:

The State contends that once a defendant admits, or the jury finds, a single aggravating factor consistent with Blakely, the "statutory maximum" becomes the maximum sentence authorized for that class of offense and affords the trial court discretion to make additional factual findings that do not comply with Blakely. We cannot agree.

The State’s argument violates the critical holding in Apprendi that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court in Blakely applied the rule expressed in Apprendi to Washington’s sentencing scheme, and nothing in Blakely supports the State’s position that once one valid aggravator is either admitted by the defendant or found by the jury, the trial court has discretion to find additional aggravating factors on its own and use those additional factors to enhance a sentence. We conclude that because the trial court relied on two aggravating factors that were neither admitted by Patrick nor determined by a jury, his enhanced sentence implicates Blakely and violates the Sixth Amendment.

The State is not the only proponent of the argument rejected in this passage. Mike Limrick suggests that such is the law in his article about to appear in Res Gestae. Doug Berman at Sentencing Law & Policy has posted Mike’s article for downloading here. The echo of the State’s argument begins on page 5 with the discussion of Traylor. It’s about the only thing in the article I don’t agree with Mike about; and the article is a very fine summary of what the Indiana courts have done so far with Blakely.

There is a second jewel to Patrick. Judge Najam, now famous for his Blakely footnotes (see this post), drops a very important one in this case:

The State asserts that we should remand to the trial court for a jury determination on the aggravating circumstances. In support, it directs us to Lawrence v. State, 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830 (1972), in which our supreme court created the bifurcated trial procedure for habitual offender enhancements, which was later enacted by the legislature. But Lawrence did not involve sentencing. It is well-settled that when a trial court relies on improper aggravating factors, and the reviewing court cannot say with confidence that the permissible aggravators would have led to the same result, it should remand for re-sentencing by the trial court or correct the sentencing on appeal. See Means, 807 N.E.2d at 776; see also Sherwood v. State, 749 N.E.2d 36, 39-40 (Ind. 2001) ("Where we find an irregularity in a trial court’s decision, we have the option to remand to the trial court for a clarification or new sentencing determination; to affirm the sentence if the error is harmless; or to weigh the proper aggravating and mitigating circumstances independently at the appellate level."). Again, because we cannot say with the confidence that the trial court would impose the same sentence without considering the improper aggravators, and the trial court in this case is in the best position to balance the aggravators and mitigators, we remand for re-sentencing in light of the remaining aggravating factors.

(Emphasis added). This footnote seems to foreclose, on remand, a jury trial of the Blakely-affected aggravating circumstances. If so, there is now a split in the Court of Appeals on jury trials after remand. Recall that in Trusley, discussed in this post, the court said, also in a footnote, that there was no problem with a jury trial after a remand, despite the lack of statutory authority.

I cannot help but wonder if it really would not be better to take the approach of the Oregon Supreme Court in Dilts, leaving this particular issue to be litigated by the parties on remand. (I have not had the opportunity to post in detail about Dilts, but it is a very interesting and possibly important case arising out of a remand for reconsideration in light of Blakely by the United States Supreme Court about a week after Blakely was decided. It is worth reading if, for nothing else, it’s discussion of statutes that are only unconstitutional in some of their applications: State v. Dilts, Supreme Court No. S49525 (OR December 16, 2004).

There is a discussion in the case about harmless error analysis. I think it muddles Chapman harmless error analysis with the "harmless error" analysis of Appellate Rule 66(B). But that’s pretty common in the cases of the Court of Appeals.

Judge Vaidik concurs only in part, because she thinks whether a person is on probation is not derivative of criminal history and so is subject to Blakely. I believe hers is the first voice with that (almost certainly correct) opinion.

Chief Judge Kirsch dissents, because he thinks that Patrick did not preserve the Blakely issues for appeal when he was sentenced in March of this year. I believe that so far, only Judge Baker has agreed with Chief Judge Kirsch on the waiver issue.

It would have been helpful, I think, had Chief Judge Kirsch elaborated at least a little about why, in this first guilty-plea case, there is no Boykin or similar problem with the plea. I guess the elaboration would run something like Patrick was challenging his sentence, not his plea. So perhaps what needs elaboration is related to what Justice Sullivan pointed out during the Heath and Smylie arguments: Indiana appellate courts take up sentencing issues for the first time on appeal all the time. So why was a Blakely or Apprendi objection required in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal?

There is really no argument in the majority opinion about waiver or foreiture of the Blakely issues. There is just a footnote saying the court rejects the State’s waiver arguments for the same reasons as Strong. (The footnote actually refers to "Ryle," so I guess the boilerplate didn’t get properly tidied. This happens to me all the time with pleadings and drives me bonkers.)

The Patrick court also follows Cowens with respect to consecutive sentences: Blakely does not affect discretionary consecutive sentences.

So will the Supreme Court give us Heath and Smylie on Christmas Eve? I think not. And I believe the court is pretty much shut down between Christmas and New Year’s.

Win98 and dial-up difficulties notwithstanding, I hope to put together some kind of summary about Blakely in Indiana at year’s end. And I highly recommend Mike Limrick’s article that’s to appear in Res Gestae which, again, is available thanks to Mike and Doug Berman here.

Christmas Eve is the big day here in Poland so . . .

Merry Christmas to all
And to all a Good-Night.

Sunday, December 19, 2004

The Sunday Pickle

At home visions of convicts and armed guards haunted him all day and some, inexplicable, deep feeling of unease prevented him from reading and concentrating. In the evenings he did not light his lamp and he lay awake all night in constant fear he might be arrested, clapped in irons and thrown into prison. He was not aware of having committed any crime and could solemnly guarantee that he would never commit murder, arson or robbery. But then, it was so easy to commit a crime accidentally or unintentionally. And how about false accusations and a miscarriage of justice? All that was highly possible, nothing odd about it at all. Indeed, hadn't the folk wisdom of old taught that one is never safe from poverty or prison? Given the present state of the law a miscarriage of justice was very much on the cards--and no wonder. People who adopt a professional, bureaucratic attitude to the suffering of others--judges, policemen and doctors, for example--become hardened to such a degree, from sheer force of habit, that even if they want to they cannot help treating their clients strictly by the book. In this respect they are no different from peasants who slaughter sheep and calves in their back yards without even noticing the blood. Having adopted this formal, soulless attitude to the individual, all a judge needs to deprive an innocent man of his civil rights and to sentence him to hard labor is time. Just give a judge time to observe the various formalities (for which he receives a salary) and then it's all over. Fat chance, then, of finding any justice and protection in this filthy little town a hundred and twenty-five miles from the nearest station! And how ludicrous even to think of justice when society considers every act of violence as rational, expedient and necessary, when every act of mercy--an acquittal, for instance--provokes a whole explosion of unsatisfied vindictiveness!

-Anton Chekhov, Ward No. 6

Friday, December 17, 2004

Bledsoe: Transfer Denied

A lot has happened in the week since I left. Three cases from the Indiana Court of Appeals dealing with Blakely--and one of them rated a mention by Doug Berman at Sentencing Law & Policy. I'll comment on those cases over the weekend as I try to catch up. There's a lot to say.

Today, Marcia Oddi at The Indiana Law Blog put up the weekly transfer list (here), and it turns out that the Indiana Supreme Court has denied transfer in Bledsoe, Judge Baker's rehearing opinion from September 28th that follows Carson's quite expansive reading of the Almendarez-Torres / Apprendi prior conviction exception that was recapitulated in Blakely.I have no idea what the denial of transfer in Bledsoe might mean. The Bledsoe panel concluded that any Blakely issues had been waived, because they had not been raised in the direct appeal.

As I think I commented at the time or elsewhere, a rehearing petition is part of a direct appeal. This is especially true in Indiana, since if the Supreme Court later grants transfer, it takes the case as if it had been originally filed there--that is, as if the Court of Appeals had never seen the case. So I find it hard to imagine that the denial of transfer in Bledsoe reflects any sort of approval of the opinion's approach to waiver.

I guess I have to conclude that it looks as though the interchangeability of "fact of prior conviction" and "criminal history" is likely to prevail in Indiana for a while. We are not going to get a different answer on this from either Heath or Smylie, since neither case involves prior convictions.

Bledsoe is, of course, a peculiar application of the prior conviction exception. The Court of Appeals recites the following: "[T]he trial court relied upon Bledsoe’s prior criminal history, noted that his rehabilitation could only occur in a penal institution, that he was on probation at the time of the offense, and that the trial court believed that Bledsoe would continue to engage in criminal activities." For whatever reason, the Court of Appeals mentions everything but a prior conviction. If all of that the court mentions is merely "derivative" of Bledsoe's criminal history, it might have been nice to know in these uncertain times what the criminal history was.

Ahh. Back at it. With Windows 98 and a dial-up, ten stories up a couple of stones' throws from the Vistula.